

# FROM REGIONAL APPROACH TO TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: PHILOLOGICAL INSIGHTS INTO JOHN PICARD'S *QUAESTIONES*

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**Abstract:** This article offers the first systematic philological reconstruction of the sources underlying John Picard of Lichtenberg's *Quaestiones*, newly available through 2025 critical edition. Traditionally regarded as an early representative of Thomism in the German Dominican *milieu*, Picard emerges here as a thinker deeply embedded in a wider transnational scholastic network. By comparing Picard's text with works by Albert the Great, John of Paris, William Peter of Godin, Godfrey of Fontaines, Hervaeus Natalis, James of Viterbo, and the Oxford master of arts John Dymdale, the study reveals previously unnoticed literal correspondences and shared argumentative structures. These findings rethink the long-standing narrative of a distinctly German philosophical *Sonderweg*, showing that medieval intellectual life in Cologne was shaped by dynamic exchanges with Parisian and Oxonian debates. Picard's *Quaestiones* thus exemplify a microhistorical case whose 'exceptional normality' illuminates the broader patterns of medieval scholastic culture.

**Keywords:** John Picard of Lichtenberg; *Quaestiones*; transnational intellectual networks; German medieval philosophy.

Un fenomeno storico può diventare comprensibile soltanto attraverso la ricostruzione dall'attività di tutte le persone che vi hanno preso parte

Carlo Ginzburg, *Microstoria: due o tre cose che so di lei*<sup>1</sup>

## 1. Introduction

Ever since Loris Sturlese and Kurt Flasch established the idea of a *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi* (CPTMA) in 1977,<sup>2</sup> scholars have regarded

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\* This study extends chapter 4 of my PhD dissertation *The Importance of Being Unoriginal: John Picard of Lichtenberg and his Quaestiones*, completed at the Thomas-Institut in Cologne and subsequently published with the assistance of the University of Cologne (see LASORELLA 2025(1), 138–145). I am grateful to my doctoral supervisors, Andreas Speer and Fiorella Retucci, to the team of the Thomas-Institut, to the anonymous peer reviewers, and to Cameron Lugo (University of Notre Dame, Indiana) for his meticulous English review.

1 GINZBURG 1994, 523.

2 The CPTMA is an editorial project created with the aim of reconstructing the significance of the German medieval philosophy through the publication of critical editions of theological and philosophical works written in the Teutonian province during the late Middle

John Picard of Lichtenberg's *Quaestiones*<sup>3</sup> as the earliest example of the reception and defense of Thomas Aquinas's texts in the German province.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the Dominican theologian's *Quaestiones* represent a vanguard of a philosophical countertrend within the Neoplatonic tradition dominating the Dominican *Studium generale* of Cologne. This major current of thought, indeed, strongly developed in Germany through the works of Albert the Great, Dietrich of Freiberg, Ulrich of Strassburg and Berthold of Moosburg and shaped the so-called 'German Mysticism' (*deutsche Mystik*).<sup>5</sup> In this article, I show philological insights into the sources of Picard's *Questiones*, made available by the new critical edition.<sup>6</sup> By looking at the figure of John Picard, my objective is to provide a more comprehensive overview of the intellectual life of the Teutonian province during the late Middle Ages.<sup>7</sup> After providing background on Picard's life and works (section 2), I highlight close textual parallels between Picard's *Quaestiones*, its sources, and several works of his contemporaries (section 3). These parallels reveal how Picard was influenced not only by local discussions, but also by a complex network of transnational debates – a fact that shapes our understanding of the German medieval intellectual climate itself (section 4).

## 2. John Picard of Lichtenberg, the *Quaestiones* and lost works

Few biographical details are available regarding John Picard of Lichtenberg and his academic career.<sup>8</sup> John Picard was a Dominican theologian who studied

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Ages from about 1250 to 1350. Cf. STURLESE 1984. See also the CPTMA project presentation, which is available at *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi*. URL: <https://meiner.de/editionen-werkausgaben-ausserhalb-der-phil-bibl/corpus-philosophorum-teutonicorum-medii-aevi.html> (accessed 20 December 2025). Currently, the progress of the CPTMA is almost complete.

3 The first attempt to study on Picard's *Quaestiones* was made in 1922 by Artur Landgraf. In his paper, Landgraf took into account the various versions of John Picard's name that circulated during the Middle Ages and identified his birthplace as the small village of Lichtenberg, now a commune in the Bas-Rhin department in the Grand Est in north-eastern France. For a detailed discussion on this topic, see LANDGRAF 1922, 511–514. For more recent work, see LASORELLA 2023.

4 STURLESE 1981, 140 and 1984, 462.

5 STURLESE 1981; STURLESE 1984, 460–461; STURLESE 1990, esp. 426; STURLESE 1993, 388; and STURLESE 1996.

6 IOHANNES PICARDI 2025.

7 STURLESE 1984, 459–461.

8 The following information in this paper on the life and work of John Picard summarizes

and taught as a *lector* in Cologne and later as a *baccalaureus* and *magister theologiae* in Paris between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Picard is attested to hold the office of *lector* in Cologne in 1303,<sup>9</sup> although the exact date of the beginning of this teaching period at the German *Studium generale* remains uncertain.<sup>10</sup> Subsequent to his teaching in Cologne, Picard had commented on the *Sententiae* in Paris around 1307 for approximately one year.<sup>11</sup> This is confirmed by the records of the Dominican general chapter, held in Padua in 1308, which state that John Picard was appointed as provincial prior in the Northwest of Germany after concluding his Parisian baccalaureate.<sup>12</sup> Afterwards, the Dominican general chapter in Piacenza in 1310 provides evidence that John Picard became a master of theology in Paris that same year. Moreover, since Picard became nuncio of Henry VII in 1313, he presumably taught the *Sententiae* there for only one year.<sup>13</sup> Unfortunately, no other sources provide further insight into his intellectual pursuits. John Picard's only extant work are the *Quaestiones*,<sup>14</sup> a series of disputed questions, which he wrote during his studies in Cologne and presumably completed before beginning his baccalaureate in Paris.<sup>15</sup> Al-

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a longer study published in LASORELLA 2023, esp. 77–82 and LASORELLA 2025, esp. 1–34. See also LANDGRAF 1922, esp. 510–511; KAEPELI 1975, 527–528 and STURLESE 1983.

9 LÖHR 1946, 35–36.

10 The question about the starting period of Picard's teaching is still matter of debate. For details on this topic, see LASORELLA 2023, 105–106.

11 COURTENAY 2014, esp. 21–22 (n. 12); SCHABEL 2018, esp. 355–356; see also DUBA, SCHABEL 2017.

12 REICHERT 1899, 37 [1308], ll. 23–27.

13 REICHERT 1899, 48 [1310], ll. 33–34; DENIFLE, EHRLE 1886, 213; COURTENAY 2010, 257.

14 For a comprehensive overview of studies on Picard's *Quaestiones*, see LANDGRAF 1922; GRABMANN 1922, 15; MARTIN 1924, 149–157; GRABMANN 1926, 410–420; SCHMAUS 1930, 412–417 (n. 67); FRIES 1937, 305–319; GRABMANN 1948, 362–365; SEŃKO 1961; SIEMIĄTKOWSKA 1961; STURLESE 1982; MOJSISCH 1983, 147–161; STURLESE 1983; SENNER 1998; PORRO 2003; BECCARISI 2010(1) and BECCARISI 2010(2); BENEDETTO 2010; COURTENAY 2010; HOENEN, IMBACH, KÖNIG-PRALONG 2010; LEONE 2010; RADEVA 2020; LASORELLA 2023; FIAMMA 2025; LASORELLA 2025(1); IOHANNES PICARDI 2025.

15 This information is confirmed by the only one manuscript that transmits in its entirety Picard's work: the codex Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 859, fols. 151ra–182vb (for the description of the Vatican manuscript, see PELZER 1931, 229–233 and MACKEN 1979, 806–811; see also LANDGRAF 1922, 523–526). At fol. 151ra, this manuscript presents an headline – written by a hand other than the one writing the main text – which identifies Picard as the author of the following questions: *Frater Johannes de Lechtinberg, lector Coloniae, postea bachillarius Parisiensis. 38 quaestiones scriptas determinavit Coloniae*. Moreover, this annotation mentions him only as a Parisian baccalaureate and makes no reference to his later *magisterium*. This could mean that either the Vatican manuscript

though discussions on Thomas's texts and doctrines were already taking place at the universities of Paris and Oxford in the years shortly following Aquinas's death in 1274, Picard's *Quaestiones* is the first witness of such debates in the German province. For this reason, Picard's *Quaestiones* represents the moment of greatest continuity with Thomas Aquinas's legacy within the framework of the *Studium generale* of Cologne, as Pasquale Porro has observed.<sup>16</sup> Besides the *Quaestiones*, little is known about Picard's intellectual production – again, the *Quaestiones* are the sole surviving complete work of Picard.<sup>17</sup>

However, Heinrich Denifle and Franz Ehrle note that John Picard would presumably have written a commentary on the *Sententiae*<sup>18</sup> since he completed

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was written before 1310 (i.e. before Picard received the title of *magister*), or that it depended on another manuscript written before 1310. Furthermore, the annotation would date back to the period between the end of the baccalaureate and before the beginning of the *magisterium*. For more information, see LASORELLA 2025(1), esp. 9–34. Further evidence that Picard discussed his *Quaestiones* in Cologne emerges in question 19 (*Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentals praecedant formam substantialem in materia*), where, in illustrating the principle that “a more perfect form includes the perfections of lesser ones,” he explicitly mentions Cologne, referring to the city's own method of measurement: “Huius exemplum manifestum est in rebus corporalibus. Secundum consuetudinem Coloniensem in una corda secundum diversa signa sunt multae ulnae; et quod in diversis terris mensuratur per ulnas vel baculos, haec una quantitas cordae indivisa totum mensurat quasi includens in se omnes inferiores mensuras, sicut in numeris dictum est et figuris, et cadit corda media quantum ad unam partem signatam inter se ipsam et quantum ad aliquas et pannum, qui mensuratur. Hoc exemplum, licet non sit per omnia simile, quia anima non est dimensionata, tamen manuducit quantum ad hoc, quod virtute perfectiva etiam potest dici quanta” (IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, 174, ll. 270–277).

16 PORRO 2003, 226. Additional case studies in the German later reception of Thomas' texts is the *Summa philosophiae* written by Nicholas of Strasburg and the *Quodlibeta* of Henry of Lubeck. For details on this topic concerning Nicholas of Strasburg, see STURLESE 1982; PELLEGRINO 2010; and IMBACH 2024. Concerning Henry of Lubeck, see instead PERRONE 2008; STURLESE 2009; VILLANI-LUBELLI 2010(1), esp. 120–124; VILLANI-LUBELLI 2010(2); and PELLEGRINO 2011.

17 KAEPELI 1975, 527–528; WEIJERS 2003, 114–116; see also LANDGRAF 1922, 520–522 and PORRO 2003, 226–245.

18 At times, the text of the *Quaestiones* ambiguously resembles that of a commentary on the *Sententiae*, as in the beginning of question 17 (*Utrum caritas, qua diligimus Deum, sit aliquod creatum in anima*): “Circa istam quaestionem est duplex opinio. Una est Magistri distinctione XVII hic praesentis” (IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, 144, ll. 4–5). The enigmatic expression ‘hic praesentis’ seems to suggest that distinction 17 is actually present within Picard's exposition and that he is referring to it. One possible hypothesis is that the text transmitted by the Vatican manuscript corresponds to work-in-progress materials (see LASORELLA 2025(2), XXII–XXIII), which Picard may have intended to use in preparation for his future lecture on the *Sententiae*.

his baccalaureate around 1306.<sup>19</sup> Albert Fries actually ascribes the first two books of an anonymous commentary on the *Sententiae* to Picard; the commentary is transmitted by the codex Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 1114. Fries grounds his attribution on a theoretical coherence between the theses shown in these two books and those present in Picard's *Quaestiones*. His hypothesis, however, has not been widely accepted.<sup>20</sup> According to Martin Grabmann, parts of the first book could also be present in the manuscript Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (ÖNB), Cod. 2165.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, Zofia Siemiątkowska discovered some fragments (dd. 1–18) of the fourth book of the commentary within the codex Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, Ms 1583 (fols. 118–142).<sup>22</sup> No critical edition of these texts is currently available. Besides his *Commentarium in libros Sententiarum*, Jacques Quétif and Jacques Échard credit a *Summa theologica* and three collections of sermons to John Picard, namely the *Sermones quadragesimales*, *Sermones dominicales* and *Sermones de Sanctis per annum*. Here too, there is no evidence of the current existence of these works, which seem to be lost indeed.<sup>23</sup>

### 3. Philological Insights into the *Quaestiones*

The scholarly literature<sup>24</sup> on the *Quaestiones* has little hesitation in identifying John Picard of Lichtenberg as a 'Thomist'.<sup>25</sup> However, few attempts have

19 DENIFLE, EHRLE 1886, 228: "(18.) fr. Johannes de Lichtenberg, theutonicus, mag. in theol., scripsit lecturam super sententias."; LAURENTIUS PIGNON 1936, 28; 63 and 74: "(47) Fr. [Iohannes de Lichtenberg] Theutonicus, magister in theologia, scripsit lecturam super sententias"; "(46) Fr. Iohannes de Li[c]htenberg Theutonicus, magister in theologia, scripsit lecturam super sententias" and "(35) Iohannes, Theutonicus, magister in theologia, scripsit super omnes quattuor libros sententiarum."

20 FRIES 1937. For the description of the codex, see PELZER 1931, 736–737. Cf. also SENNER 1995, 65–69; STEGMÜLLER 1947, 232–233 and FRIEDMAN 2002, 59–60 (n. 48).

21 GRABMANN 1926, 410–420.

22 SIEMIĄTKOWSKA 1961, 29–32.

23 QUÉTIF, ÉCHARD 1719, 523; see also PAQUOT 1768, 282–283. On the hitherto unproven relationship between a John Picard's *Summa theologica* and the anonymous *Summa de bono* which is preserved in codex Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 4305, see GRABMANN 1926, 414.

24 Take, for instance, FIAMMA 2025, whose aim is to emphasize that contemporary historiography has predominantly portrayed John Picard as a 'Thomist'. In that study, the author closes with a call for further research on Picard's primary and intermediate sources, see FIAMMA 2025, 167. The present study, together with the new critical edition and new research on Picard's metaphysics, takes up precisely this challenge.

25 For an analysis of the historiographical use of terms such as 'Thomism' and 'early Thom-

been made to philologically reconstruct the network of sources that influenced Picard in composing his *Quaestiones* and the texts that share literal correspondences with it.<sup>26</sup> In view of the information made available by the new critical edition, I here aim to fill this historiographical gap. To accomplish this, I will show verbatim textual correspondences between Picard's *Quaestiones*, its sources, and works of his contemporaries.<sup>27</sup> Such textual correspondences are the most evident means of establishing connections between different authors and of reconstructing the intellectual life of a particular cultural context over time – in this case, that of the *Studium generale* of Cologne. What follows is divided into three parts, each analyzing authors and works, of different geographical areas, which share clear textual relationships with Picard's *Quaestiones*: (a) Cologne – Albert the Great; (b) Paris – John of Paris, William Peter of Godin, Godfrey of Fontaines, Hervaeus Natalis and James of Viterbo; and (c) Oxford – John Dymdale. Even at first glance, these philological findings demonstrate that we should situate Picard's *Quaestiones* within a broader transnational setting that extends from Paris to Oxford – not merely the German Dominican *Studium* of Cologne.

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ism,' particularly in relation to John Picard of Lichtenberg and other authors active in Germany during the early fourteenth century, see COURTENAY 2010, 257–259. Here Courtenay masterfully underlines “the need, when exploring Thomism in Germany in the early fourteenth century, to see it not as a conflict of schools of thought but as an energetic debate among individuals, a *Gesprächskreis*, across the lines of religious orders and including when relevant secular theologians as well. The Dominican *studia* in Germany in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were not geographically isolated from events and currents of thought at *studia* outside Germany, and the debates over the teaching of Thomas transcended the boundaries of order and nationality.” The same conclusions were reached in LASORELLA 2023, 87–107 and LASORELLA 2025(1), 35–138.

26 The most recent attempts in tracing Picard's sources highlighted the significance of Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome and Dietrich of Freiberg. For example, see STURLESE 1982; SENNER 1998; PORRO 2003; BECCARISI 2010(1); BECCARISI 2010(2); BENEDETTO 2010; HOENEN, IMBACH, KÖNIG-PRALONG 2010; LEONE 2010. For a synthesis of all of these studies, see FIAMMA 2025. For example, according to the new edition of Picard's *Quaestiones*, Henry's position is considered particularly with regard to the epistemological status of theology (IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, 4, ll. 24–29), the theory of light (IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, 37, l. 207), the identification of its subject (IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, 90, l. 136–91, l. 146), and the doctrine of the substantial form (IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, 156, l. 106–157, l. 115).

27 Not all the textual passages presented in this paper can be considered direct sources of Picard. Rather, some are so close in time and content to Picard's *Quaestiones* that they do not allow to establish a clear direction in the dependence relation between them and the *Quaestiones*.

### 3.a) Cologne – Albert the Great

In 1981, Loris Sturlese identified two opposing philosophical currents at the *Studium generale* of Cologne in the early fourteenth century: a Thomistic and a Neoplatonic tendency.<sup>28</sup> Sturlese finds evidence of these two currents of thought by examining the distinct ways in which German medieval scholars understood the figure of Albert the Great. According to his interpretation, Albert was perceived within this intellectual *milieu* either as a ‘scientist’ (*dominus Albertus*) or as a ‘wise man’ (*Bischof Albercht*) – the first originating from John Picard, and the second to Dietrich of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart.<sup>29</sup>

To support his view, Sturlese points to five explicit references that Picard makes to Albert and his works.<sup>30</sup> In these quotations, Picard mentions Albert as a scientific authority on natural phenomena, particularly in the context of explaining the metaphysical nature of light. Further, Picard invokes Albert as a subtle commentator on Aristotle’s writings to provide a nuanced interpretation on the status of the elements within mixed substances and to elucidate Aristotle’s doctrine of relative nouns.<sup>31</sup>

28 STURLESE 1981, 139–147. Nevertheless, the present study strongly insist on the problematic nature of broad labels such as ‘Thomism’ or ‘Anti-Thomism’, which always require proper historical contextualisation and specification. On this topic, see ROBIN-FABRE 2011, esp. 97 and HOENEN, IMBACH, KÖNIG-PRALONG 2010, esp. 227–234.

29 My study will not directly address the topic of the so-called ‘Operation Picardi’ (*die Operation Picardis*). The term *die Operation Picardis* is employed by Sturlese to refer to the pioneering use of Albert’s writings by Picard, which supposedly influenced the philosophical perspective on Albert’s figure. This perspective, says Sturlese, subsequently spread to later German authors, including Nicholas of Strasburg and Henry of Erfurt (STURLESE 1981, 143–144). There is, however, limited information available on the direct connection between the scientific usage of Albert’s name or works in Picard’s *Quaestiones* and other German thinkers. Further investigation is therefore needed to confirm Sturlese’s hypothesis regarding Picard’s role as the founder of a specific philosophical attitude in Cologne.

30 STURLESE 1981, 139–143, esp. 140 fn. 25. The five quotations can be found in IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, 37, l. 206 (question 5: *Utrum lux sit qualitas realis vel intentionalis*); 43, ll. 392 and 402 (q. 5); 81, l. 6 (question 9: *Utrum Deus possit potentiam passivam reducere in actum absque obiecto*); Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat 859, f. 171rb, l. 14 (question 21: *Utrum elementa sint actu in mixto*).

31 Concerning the quotation present in question 9 (IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, 81, l. 116), Landgraf made a mistake in reading the Latin text in the Vatican manuscript here, which transmits ‘optime’ rather than ‘optimi’. In light of this mistake, Landgraf’s opinion becomes slightly misleading: “Das gewaltige Ringen um die Lehre des hl. Thomas v. Aquin war nicht auf die Hauptzentren des Kampfes, Paris und Oxford beschränkt; auch Deutschland und vor allem das Studium von Köln nahm an ihm regen Anteil. [...] Es ist nicht einseitige Begeisterung, sondern treue und biedere Sachlichkeit, mit der er [Picardi] einmal

Viewing John Picard through the lens of the new edition further bolsters this reading of Picard as a pioneering figure in understanding Albert as a scientist and commentator on Aristotle. Besides the well-known explicit reference to Albert's commentaries on Ps.-Dionysius's *De divinis nominibus* and Aristotle's *Metaphysica*,<sup>32</sup> I argue that Albert's *De homine* is another major literal source of Picard's *Quaestiones*. Albert's *De homine* is cited in both question 5 (*Utrum lux sit qualitas realis vel intentionalis*) and question 6 (*Utrum species intentionales recipiant numerum ab obiecto vel subiecto*). In the first case, Picard employs a series of arguments, outlined by Albert in his own work, to support the position that light is nothing other than the manifestation of colors (*evidentia colorum*). Below is a table highlighting verbatim correspondence:

| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i> , 32, l. 100–33, l. 104:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, <i>De homine</i> , 158, l. 65–159, l. 3:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
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| <p>Unde est tertia opinio, quae dicit, quod lux vel lumen nihil aliud est nisi evidentia colorum, id est color evidens. Unde candorem vel intensum album dicimus quandoque lucem, et Philosophus dicit caelum album in <i>De caelo</i> et mundo.</p> <p>Et hoc probant primo auctoritate, quia dicit Philosophus in <i>quodam capitulo De coloribus</i>: “Dico autem lucem esse hypostasim colorum”. Hypostasim autem dicit substantiam eius, cuius est. Item <i>Alfarabius</i>: “Colores fiunt ex admixtione ignis cum corporibus, et lux non est</p> | <p>Pro hac tamen opinione videntur facere quaedam auctoritates philosophorum. Dicitur enim in <i>quodam capitulo De Coloribus</i>: “Dico lucem esse hypostasim colorum”; sed hypostasia est substantia; ergo lux est substantia colorum. Item <i>Alfarabius</i> “Colores fiunt ex admixtione ignis cum corporibus, et lux non est causa</p> |

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Albert den Großen und den hl. Thomas „viri optimi“ nennt” (LANDGRAF 1922, 510–511). However, in contrast to what Landgraf says, John Picard does not state his opinion on the personalities of Albert or Thomas, but he says that they rightly interpret the opinion of the Commentator on Aristotle's doctrine of relative nouns and the relationship between the “what is understood” and “who is understanding.” See IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, 81, ll. 120–124: “Unde cum isti viri optime viderint Commentatorem, quando praedictum passum exposuerunt, nec tamen illam expositionem acceptaverunt, quod patet ex hoc, quod, cum sit notabilis valde, quod tamen nullus eorum eius mentionem facit, unde verisimile est, quod dictum eius non habeat veritatem ibi de intellectu respectu intelligentis, secundum quod isti eum intelligunt.” This error has been unnoticed throughout the entire historiography on Picard, and it remains present still in FIAMMA 2025, 145.

32 See *supra* fn. 30.

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|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p><i>causa in inductione coloris ad visum tantum, sed in esse eius</i>".</p> <p>Item hoc probant per duo experimenta. Primum est, quod, <i>quando sol eclipsatur, illa, quae fuerunt alba, apparent pallida et post iterum apparent alba.</i></p> <p>Secundum est, quod, si valde <i>parum de rubeo vino</i> ponatur <i>in vitro</i> et ponatur contra solem, ut transluceat, apparet <i>vinum</i> album, si autem plus, apparet rubeum, si autem adhuc plus esset, apparet quasi nigrum, et variatur color, secundum quod lux solis magis vel minus <i>potest penetrare</i> vinum.</p> | <p><i>in inductione coloris ad visum tantum, sed in esse eius</i>".</p> <p>Item, experimentum videtur ad hoc facere, quia in eclipsi solis, <i>quando sol in parte tegitur, alba statim apparent pallida</i>; et hoc non contingit nisi ex subtractione lucis. Et ita cum lux subtracta diminuatur colorem et posita augmentet, videtur quod lux sit essentialis causa coloris.</p> <p>Item, aliud experimentum est in vitro et vino, quia si <i>parum de vino rubeo</i> infundatur <i>in vitro</i> puro, sol penetrans <i>vinum</i> in fundo vitri generabit albedinem, quae est color similior luci inter colores. Si autem multum infundatur, non erit in fundo albedo, quia lux tunc non <i>potest penetrare</i>, ut in fundo multiplicetur.</p> |
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In question 6, instead, concerning the problem of the number of intentional species, Picard references two scientific experiments that Albert described in *De homine*. Despite the slight paraphrasing of Albert's text, the close resemblance between the two works is evident:

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| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i> , 53, ll. 214–221:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, <i>De homine</i> , 181, ll. 27–41:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Ponatur unus <i>oculus versus orientem</i> et respiciat visus <i>versus occidentem</i> et vocetur A, alius e converso in <i>occidente</i> respiciens <i>versus orientem</i> et vocetur B; et sit obiectum ipsius B in oriente et vocetur C, quod <i>sit album</i> , et obiectum ipsius A in occidentem et vocetur D et <i>sit nigrum</i> . | Secunda probatur per demonstrationem. Sit enim A <i>oculus versus orientem</i> positus, sed aspiciens ad <i>occidentem</i> , B autem <i>oculus positus versus occidentem</i> , sed aspiciens ad <i>orientem</i> ; et sit distantia media decem cubitorum. Ex parte autem orientis <i>sit C album</i> corpus vehementis albedinis immutans aërem usque ad oculum positum in opposito ex parte occidentis. Ex parte autem occidentis <i>sit D nigrum</i> corpus vehementis nigredinis immutans aërem usque ad oculum versus orientem. Et distent ista corpora et isti oculi |

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| <p>Ergo si C immutat B et D immutat A, oportet, quod species eorum <i>in medio</i> concurrant. Aut ergo in illo puncto sunt unum, et sic neutrum secundum propriam rationem perveniet ad suum sensum et sic erunt duo obiecta opposita in eodem, aut erunt duae distinctae species ibidem, et tunc habetur propositum.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | <p>diametraliter, et in eodem tempore immutetur unus ab albo et alter a nigro. Ergo necesse est istos duos colores sibi occurrere <i>in medio</i> et tunc simul esse actu in illo, quod impossibile est, si contrarietatem habent et insunt aëri sicut accidentia in subiecto.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| <p>IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i>, 54, ll. 224–233:</p> <p><i>Licet motus circuli, qui est circulatio, non habeat contrarium secundum Philosophum VIII Physicorum, tamen motus, qui est super circum, potest habere contrarium.</i></p> <p>Ponatur ergo <i>circulus</i> et <i>dividatur</i> diametraliter per medium, et unum punctum diametri sive incisionis circuli vocetur <i>A</i>, aliud vocetur <i>B</i> et moveatur <i>C</i> per unam partem versus <i>B</i> et <i>D</i> per aliam partem sive <i>per alium semicirculum</i>, tunc in <i>B</i> unum sistet motum alterius, ne procedat. Si autem hoc contingit in motu circulari, et <i>in recto</i> continget.</p> <p>Ergo nec secundum praecedens argumentum<sup>33</sup> nec <i>C</i> permittet transire <i>D</i> ad oculum <i>A</i> nec <i>D</i> permittet transire <i>C</i> ad oculum <i>B</i>, dum conveniunt in medio puncto, et sic neuter oculorum aliquid videbit.</p> | <p>ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, <i>De homine</i>, 183, ll. 1–17:</p> <p>Item probatum est in <i>VIII Physicorum</i> quod <i>licet motus circuli, qui est circulatio, non habeat contrarium, motus tamen super circum potest habere contrarium.</i></p> <p><i>Dividatur enim circulus</i> per diametrum et sint puncta contactus diametri <i>A</i> et <i>B</i>; et <i>D</i> sit mobile motum ex <i>A</i> in <i>B</i> per unum semicirculum, et transeat per <i>B</i> et vadat in <i>A</i> per alium semicirculum, <i>C</i> autem sit mobile ex <i>A</i> <i>per alium semicirculum</i> et transeundo per <i>B</i> veniat in <i>A</i>. Ista duo mota occurrent sibi in <i>B</i>, et unum sistet motum alterius, eo quod sunt ad situs oppositos circumferentiae; ergo similiter erit <i>in motu recto</i>.</p> <p>Si igitur album immutat versus orientem oculum aliquem, et nigrum versus occidentem oculum alium, et album et nigrum sunt in medio sicut in motu, ut dicunt illi, de necessitate motus unus sistet alterum, et sic neuter oculus immutabitur, quia unus non permittet alium transire ad oculum.</p> |

<sup>33</sup> The “previous argument” referenced here corresponds to that presented in the preceding table of contents, namely, IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, 53, ll. 214–221.

Moreover, in question 5, other two implicit literal correspondences with Albert's *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus* have been identified:

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
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| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i> , 33, ll. 93–95:                                                                                                                                                                                                      | ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1972, <i>Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus</i> , 63, ll. 48–53:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Sed dicunt quidam, quod illa lux, quae sentitur vel videtur, non est illa forma substantialis, sed alia lux. Sed hoc nihil est, quia simili modo possem dicere, quod lux esset pes asini, non ille, qui videtur, sed quidam alius.                                    | Ad hoc autem dicunt, quod lux, quae est forma substantialis, non est visibilis, sed haec lux quae videtur, est quaedam alia lux causata ab ipsa. Sed hoc nihil est, quia similiter possem dicere, quod lux esset pes asini, non iste qui videtur, sed quidam alius.                                                                                                           |
| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i> , 37, ll. 215–220:                                                                                                                                                                                                    | ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1972, <i>Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus</i> , 65, ll. 23–33:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Praeterea lux etiam non dat esse spirituale speciebus in organo completum, sed hoc habet ex natura subiecti, quia omne, quod recipitur, secundum modum recipientis et non recepti recipitur. Sensus autem recipiens dicitur spiritualis ab anima, cuius est potentia. | Ad id vero quod primo obicitur de alio articulo, dicendum, quod lux non dat esse spirituale completum, secundum quod spirituale dicitur ab anima, sed species rei visae recipit perfectam spiritualitatem ab organo, in quo suscipitur, quia omne quod est in alio, est in eo secundum potestatem recipientis, recipit autem quandam spiritualitatem et maximam subtilitatem; |
| Et secundum hoc etiam lux potest dici spiritualis in medio, sicut et unidum aeris dicitur a Philosopho spirituale, quia propter sui subtilitatem non est incorporabile.                                                                                               | et secundum hoc lux potest dici forma spiritualis, sicut humidum aëris dicitur a Philosopho spirituale, quia propter sui subtilitatem non est incorporabile.                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |

The final passage is of particular interest, since Picard employs Albert's text to reject the opinion that light is an intentional entity (*lumen sit ens intentionale*), a position Picard implicitly attributes to John of Paris. Significantly, Picard's *Quaestiones* hereby reveal an active dialogue between Cologne and Parisian sources. Within this dialogue, the local Dominican tradition and the broader Parisian framework mutually interact and, when necessary, complement, refine, or even correct each other's doctrines and perspectives.

### 3.b) Paris – John of Paris, William Peter of Godin, Godfrey of Fontaines, Hervaeus Natalis and James of Viterbo

Among the wide range of Parisian authors and works Picard cites, an important source for the *Quaestiones* is John of Paris, who composed his *Commentarium in libros Sententiarum* in Paris presumably between 1292–1293 and 1294–1295.<sup>34</sup> In his question 5, Picard fully reproduces, verbatim, John of Paris's metaphysical theory of light as presented in distinction 13 of book II of his *Commentarium in libros Sententiarum*:

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
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| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones</i> I–XIX, 36, l. 172–37, l. 199:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | IOHANNES PARISIENSIS 1961, <i>Commentarium in libros Sententiarum</i> (Reportatio) II, 117, l. 20–118, l. 46:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| <p>Unde est alia opinio, quae dicit, quod lumen sit ens intentionale, et isti ad hoc tria faciunt. Primo se declarant, secundo probant per rationes, tertio per signa.</p> <p>Primo sic dicunt, quod <i>non differunt lux et lumen sicut calor in igne et calor in alio, sive aere sive aqua, sed differunt lux et lumen sicut color in obiecto et color in medio</i>; color autem in obiecto sive subiecto habet esse reale sicut albedo in pariete, sed in medio, scilicet aere vel diaphano, habet esse intentionale; sic et lux, prout est in corpore lucido, scilicet sole vel stella, habet esse reale, sed prout est in aere, ubi vocatur lumen, est ens intentionale.</p> <p>Secundo probant. Primo sic: <i>Lumen dat colori esse intentionale; ergo multo magis ipsum lumen erit ens intentionale.</i></p> <p>Secundo, <i>nulla qualitas realis posita supra sensum facit sensum, sed intentionalis facit; lumen autem positum supra sensum videtur; ergo est intentionalis.</i> Item hoc manifeste dicit Commentator Super II De anima, quod lumen est ens intentionale.</p> | <p>Et ideo dicendum, quod lux est qualitas activa ipsius lucidi. Sed de luimine, quid est? Dicunt quidam diversimode, et idem dicit diversimode in diversis locis. In uno loco dicit, quod est qualitas realis, alibi quod est intentionalis. Et istud teneo, quia <i>non differunt lux et lumen sicut forma substantialis ignis et calor, sed sicut color in obiecto et in medio.</i> Et hoc patet sic.</p> <p><i>Lumen dat esse intentionale colori. Ergo multo fortius etiam in se habet esse intentionale.</i></p> <p>Item, <i>nulla qualitas realis posita super sensum facit sensum, sed intentionalis facit.</i> Sed <i>lumen immediate positum super oculum facit sensum.</i> Ergo etc.</p> |

34 On the dating of John of Paris's *Commentarium*, see MULLER 1961, XXIX–XXX.

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| <p>Tertio ponunt signa ostendendo differentiam realis ab intentionali et dixerunt primo ex natura sui multiplicationis, <i>quia nulla forma realis multiplicatur in instanti, sed intentionalis bene.</i></p> <p><i>Talis autem est differentia inter lucem et lumen.</i></p> <p><i>Prima differentia est ex natura suae dependentiae, quia qualitas realis tantum quantum “ad fieri” dependet a sua causa, sed intentionalis quantum “ad fieri” et quantum “ad esse” et quantum “ad conservari”, quia talia non remanent nisi in praesentia suae causae, ut patet.</i></p> <p><i>Secunda differentia est ex natura suae numerationis, quia duae qualitates reales solo numero differentes non possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, sed duae intentionales bene sunt simul in eodem, sicut probat Perspectivus dupliciter.</i></p> <p><i>Primo per duas umbras, quia duabus candelis accensis et interposito corpore opaco in medio causat duas umbras, quod non posset esse, nisi lumen utriusque candelae esset in medio; quaelibet enim umbra est privatio sui luminis.</i></p> <p><i>Secundo hoc probant per foramen in tabula, per quod transeunt duo radii se intersecantes et apparent duae refulgentiae in pariete; quaelibet autem refulgentia est a suo proprio radio.</i></p> | <p>Item, hoc patet ex differentiis, quae sunt inter intentionale et reale.</p> <p><i>Una differentia est, quia forma intentionalis multiplicatur in instanti, sed forma realis non.</i></p> <p><i>Talis autem differentia est inter lucem et lumen, ut patet.</i></p> <p><i>Secunda differentia est ex natura suae dependentiae a sua causa, quia qualitas realis dependet tantum quantum ad fieri a sua causa, sed intentionalis dependet quantum ad fieri et quantum ad esse. Quia talia non remanent nisi in praesentia suae causae, ut patet.</i></p> <p><i>Tertia differentia est ex modo suae numerationis. Quia duae qualitates reales solm numero differentes non possunt esse in eodem subiecto, licet diversae specie esse possint. Sed, sicut probat Perspectivus, duo lumina possunt esse in eodem subiecto simul. Et hoc probat dupliciter.</i></p> <p><i>Primo, per umbram, quae est privatio luminis. Quia duabus candelis accensis, et interposito corpore opaco in medio, causat duas ombras, quod non posset esse, nisi lumen utriusque candelae esse in medio.</i></p> <p><i>Item, hoc probat per foramen in tabula, per quod transeunt duo radii se intersecantes, et ideo sunt in eodem loco. Quare etc.</i></p> |
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Among John of Paris' works, John Picard also appears to draw on his *Correctorium corruptorii “Circa”*, composed between the years 1282 and 1284.<sup>35</sup> This occurs in question 16 (*Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma*), where Picard presents the view of those who maintain that the soul is material, although they claim that the matter of the soul does not possess the same nature as corporeal matter. This position follows indeed a threefold structure that closely mirrors

<sup>35</sup> See MULLER 1941, XXXIV–XXXVII.

the model established by the literary genre of the *Correctoria*, which derives from William de la Mare's *Correctorium fratris Thomae*: first, the advocates of this position state their own solution; second, they present and successfully respond to the objections raised against them; third, they explain their intended purpose.

Notably, Picard quotes the very same text found in the *Correctorium corruptorii "Circa"* almost verbatim:<sup>36</sup>

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| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i> , 127, ll. 30–33; 127, l. 43–128, l. 54:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | IOHANNES PARISIENSIS 1941, <i>Correctorium corruptorii "Circa"</i> , 144, ll. 2–20: <sup>37</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| <p>Et ideo est alia opinio, quae dicit, quod in anima est materia, sed non eiusdem rationis cum materia corporali. Et ad hoc faciunt tria. Primo se ipsos declarant, secundo rationes contra se adducunt et solvunt eas, tertio probant suum intentum.</p> <p>[...]</p> <p>Secundo arguunt contra se ipsos sic: <i>Augustinus</i> – ut dicunt aliqui – <i>II Super Genesim ad litteram dicit, quod anima non est facta neque ex spirituali neque ex corporali materia.</i></p> <p>Item si <i>anima est forma corporalis, aut tota, et tunc nulla pars eius est materia, aut secundum partem</i>; non illam, quae est materia, cum non sit actus; ergo secundum <i>illam</i> formalem. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia tunc illa pars informaret duas materias, scilicet spirituales et corporales, aut oporteret destruere alteram partem, quod non concedunt, quia sic anima destrueretur; ideo <i>quod recipitur in alio, per modum recipientis recipitur</i>;</p> | <p>Circa quaestionem 75 articulo 5 calumniantur. Ibi dicitur in responsione principali, quod anima non est composita ex materia et forma.</p> <p>Quod ipse probat primo per <i>Augustinum</i>, VII<sup>o</sup> <i>Super Genesim ad litteram</i>, ubi probat, <i>quod anima non est facta ex materia corporali nec spirituali.</i></p> <p>Secundo, quia <i>anima ex ratione sua est forma alicuius, aut ergo secundum se totam, et sic nulla pars eius est materia, quia materia est potentia tantum et forma est actus, aut secundum partem sui, et sic illam partem vocamus animam et cuius ipsa est actus primo, dicemus primum animatum.</i></p> <p>Tertio, quia <i>quod recipitur in alio, recipitur per modum recipientis</i>. Sic autem cognoscitur unumquodque sicut est</p> |

<sup>36</sup> The presence of the *Correctoria* in Picard's *quaestio* 16, along with his personal doctrinal position on the metaphysical composition of the soul, was discussed at the 9<sup>th</sup> International Congress Sociedad de Filosofía Medieval, *Transmission and Interpretation of Knowledge. From Late Antiquity to the Early Modern Period* (Universidad de Córdoba, 3–5 December 2025), and will be published in a forthcoming contribution.

<sup>37</sup> The same arguments are found, albeit in a more extended version, in GUILLELMUS DE LA MARE 1927, 118.

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| <p><i>anima autem</i> intellective recipit res absolute sine materia; ergo caret materia.</p> <p><i>Quarto si est composita ex materia et forma</i>, recipitur <i>in ea</i> individualitate; sed hoc est proprium sensus.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | <p>forma eius in cognoscente. <i>Anima autem</i> intellectiva cognoscit rem aliquam in sua natura absoluta, puta lapidem, in quantum est lapis absolute. Est igitur forma lapidis absolute secundum propriam rationem formalem anima intellectiva. Anima ergo intellectiva est forma absoluta, non aliquid compositum ex materia et forma.</p> <p><i>Quarto, si anima esset composita ex materia et forma</i>, formae rerum reciperentur <i>in ea</i> ut individuales, et sic non cognosceret nisi singulare, sicut accidit in potentiis sensitivis, quae recipiunt formas rerum in organo corporali. Materia enim est principium individuationis formarum. Anima ergo non componitur ex materia et forma.</p> |
| <p>IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i>, 131, ll. 136–143 and 132, ll. 148–168:</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | <p>IOHANNES PARISIENSIS 1941, <i>Correctorium corruptorii "Circa"</i>, 150, ll. 206–211; 151, ll. 224–230; 151, ll. 232–235; 151, ll. 238–242 and 152, ll. 244–247:</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| <p>Secundo patet, quod rationes non solvunt. <i>Quod primo dicunt, quod haec auctoritas non est Augustini</i>, falsum dicunt quantum ad sensum, licet non sint verba omnino, quia eodem libro cap. 11 et 12 usque ad 16 disputans, utrum sit ex materia corporali vel spiritali sive vivente sive non vivente, postquam <i>multa inconvenientia</i> probavit, <i>concludit</i>, quod <i>melius</i> est inter dubitationes dicere, quod <i>ex nullo</i> tali dicatur facta fuisse, sed dicatur: simul <i>creata fuerunt prima die, antequam corpori sexto die infunderetur</i>, nisi sint alia simul creata. Hoc autem dicimus creari, quod <i>nec ex materia spiritali nec corporali</i> forma.</p> <p>[...]</p> | <p>Deficiunt nihilominus in responsionibus ad argumenta. <i>Quod enim dicunt, quod auctoritas non invenitur</i>, patet auctoritas Super Genesim ad litteram, libro VII<sup>o</sup> cap. ubi probat Augustinus, quod anima non est facta <i>ex materia corporali nec spiritali</i>, reducendo ad <i>multa inconvenientia</i>.</p> <p>Et ideo in fine <i>concludit</i>, cap. 26, quod inter omnes dubitationes "<i>melius videtur, quod sit ex nihilo creata prima die, antequam corpori infunderetur</i>".</p> <p>[...]</p>                                                                                                                                                                                     |

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| <p>Item nec tertio, quia in <i>libro De causis</i> ponitur illa <i>propositio</i>, scilicet ibi <i>Commentator</i> utitur isto sensu</p>                                                                                       | <p>Ista enim <i>propositio</i> accipitur de <i>libro De Causis</i>, propositione ubi <i>Commentator</i> utitur praedicta propositione in <i>sensu</i> in quo utitur ea praedictus doctor, scilicet quantum ad conditionem materialitatis et immaterialitatis.</p>                                                                                 |
| <p>et dicit, quod, licet causa prima sit una, tamen diversae res diversimode eam recipiunt, quia quaedam modo corporali, quaedam vero modo spiritali.</p>                                                                      | <p>Unde dicit, “quod quamvis causa prima sit una, tamen diversae res secundum sui diversas condiciones eam recipiunt diversimode. Nam quaedam eam recipiunt modo corporali, quaedam vero modo spiritali” etc.</p>                                                                                                                                 |
| <p>Et eorum exemplum de oculo non videtur, quia, ut quidam dicunt, visus nullam speciem recipit, <i>sed organum</i>, quod etiam est materiale.</p>                                                                             | <p>[...]<br/>De potentia sensitiva duo falsa dicunt. Unum est quod dicunt, quod potentia sensitiva recipit species sensibilibus. Et hoc est falsum, quia potentia sensitiva non recipit speciem, <i>sed organum</i> animatum.</p>                                                                                                                 |
| <p>Item cum dicitur, quod sensus recipit <i>species sine materia</i>, intelligitur materia, in qua est, <i>sed non sine omni</i>, quia recipitur in organo materiali.</p>                                                      | <p>[...]<br/>Aliud falsum est, quia dicunt, quod species sensibiles recipiuntur sine materia. Hoc enim falsum est vel falso modo intellectum. Quia recipiuntur quidem <i>species sensibiles</i> in organo sensus <i>sine materia</i> et subiecto ipsius sensibilis, <i>non tamen sine omni materia</i>, quia sunt in organi materia receptae.</p> |
| <p>Unde Philosophus ponit <i>exemplum II De anima</i>: Sicut <i>cera</i> recipit sigillum <i>sine materia sigilli</i>, est tamen in materia cerae, sicut convenit etiam in aliis formis, quae insunt, sicut imagines sunt.</p> | <p>[...]<br/>Et haec est intentio Philosophi, <i>II° De Anima</i>, sicut apparet per suum <i>exemplum</i> de <i>cera</i> in sigillo, quia figura sigilli in <i>cera</i> recipitur <i>sine materia sigilli</i>. Tamen non est ibi sine materia omnino, quia ipsa <i>cera</i> est materia in qua ipsius figurae impressae.</p>                      |

In addition to these examples, I have identified notable textual parallels with the *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* of William Peter of Godin and Hervaeus Natalis in Picard’s *Quaestiones*.

The French theologian William Peter of Godin<sup>38</sup> released his *Commentarium in libros Sententiarum*, the so-called *Lectura Thomasina*, around 1300–1301, after his second lecture course in Paris.<sup>39</sup> Godin’s work and John Picard of Lichtenberg’s *Quaestiones* show clear textual parallels in two different questions: question 1 (*Utrum theologia sit scientia*) and question 3 (*Utrum Deus potuerit sumere humanam naturam sine supposito*). I have examined the parallels in question 1 in a previous study.<sup>40</sup> On that occasion, Picard’s version of the text appeared to be more philosophical compelling, complete and coherent than that of Godin. Moreover, within a key passage of the text, both Picard and Godin were implicitly quoting Aquinas’ *Summa theologiae*, and Picard’s version showed a closer adherence to the original than Godin’s. This supports the hypothesis that Picard did not rely on Godin when composing his text; rather, Godin relied on Picard. Unlike the textual parallels in question 1, those discovered in question 3 do not provide further evidence to definitively confirm this hypothesis.<sup>41</sup> While Picard and Godin share a strikingly similar text, both appear to reproduce faithfully Godfrey of Fontaines’s position on the distinction between *suppositum* and *natura*, as articulated in question 5 of his *Quodlibet VII*.<sup>42</sup> Their respective dependence on Godfrey’s text is so close that, at first glance, it seems virtually impossible to determine which of the two served as the source for the other.<sup>43</sup> Below

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38 Fiamma seems to disagree with the idea that Godin was French and says he was actually German, see FIAMMA 2025, 159. Even though he has given this information, Fiamma has not provided any evidence to back up his statements.

39 For more information about Godin’s life and work, see BONINI 2021. See also DECKER 1967, 28. For some more recent studies on Godin’s *Lectura Thomasina*, see also GORIS, PICKAVÉ 1998; COLLI 2017; COLLI 2018, 21–42; SPEER, COLLI, BONINI 2020.

40 LASORELLA 2023.

41 Commenting upon this hypothesis, Fiamma argues that no attempt had been made to find a common source underlying the entirety of the texts transmitted by Picard and Godin, see FIAMMA 2025, 165–166. On the other hand, this very possibility had already been proposed in LASORELLA 2023. However, differently from that case, the common source between Picard’s and Godin’s texts was found in the third question.

42 See SENNER 1998, 398. Godfrey’s *Quodlibet VII* was written in Paris around 1290/1292 (See WIPPEL 1981, XV–XXXV). This specific reference to Godfrey’s *Quodlibet VII*, question 5 is a case of interest insofar as, in this same place, Godfrey implicitly refers to Giles of Rome’s *De compositione angelorum*, itself a response to the metaphysical problems raised by Thomas Aquinas’s account of the distinction between *suppositum* and *natura*. On this topic, see WIPPEL 1981, 225–257, and TRAPP 1935.

43 Determining the dependence relation between Picard’s *Quaestiones* and Godin’s *Lectura* requires a deeper doctrinal and philological analysis in this specific case, as well as a more systematic textual comparison. I intend to undertake this analysis in a future contribution.

are tables which compare Picard's *Quaestiones* and Godin's *Lectura*, as well as Godfrey's *Quodlibet* VII:

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| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones</i> I-XIX, 19, l. 19–20, l. 25:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | GUILLELMUS DE GODINO 2025, <i>Lectura Thomasina</i> I, 46, ll. 35–42:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| Hoc autem dicunt propter differentiam <i>realem</i> esse. Sed modus ponendi est duplex. Unus, quod ita dicendum differentia, <i>non est per aliquam rem additam, sed per quendam modum, qui communicatur in re unius praedicamenti ex coniunctione ad rem alterius praedicamenti, sicut materia extensa differt a se ipsa non extensa non per rem additam, sed per modum, inquantum materia est extensa affecta accidentibus.</i> | Et quia oportet <i>realem</i> diversitatem esse inter ista, quae non potest esse per substantiam vel accidens, ut dicunt, ideo dicunt, quod talis distinctio realis <i>non est per rem aliquam superadditam, sed per quendam modum, qui causatur in re unius praedicamenti ex coniunctione ad rem alterius praedicamenti, sicut materia extensa differt a materia non extensa realiter, non tamen materia extensa dicit aliquam rem aliam a materia, sed modum tantum, scilicet esse tantum accidentalibus affectum.</i> |

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| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones</i> I-XIX, 19, ll. 7–13:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | GUILLELMUS DE GODINO 2025, <i>Lectura Thomasina</i> I, 45, ll. 22–29:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS 1914, <i>Quodlibet</i> V-VII, 301:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| <p>Prima, quod <i>differunt realiter</i>, et hoc attenditur <i>penes triplicem modum</i>.</p> <p>Patet, quod differunt in modo <i>praedicandi, quia unum non praedicatur de altero</i>. Hoc autem non esset, nisi in modo <i>includeretur differentia realis, quia, quae sunt idem re, differentia ratione vel modo significandi</i>, praedicantur de se non praedicatione formali, sed ea, <i>quae est per identitatem</i>, sicut “Deus est divini-</p> | <p>Quantum ergo ad primum sciendum, quod opinio aliquorum est quod concretum et abstractum <i>realiter differunt penes triplicem modum</i>.</p> <p>Primo penes modum <i>praedicandi, quia unum non praedicatur de alio</i>, quod esse non potest, ut dicunt, nisi cum <i>differentia</i> in modo praedicandi sit etiam <i>realis differentia, quia differentia in modo significandi</i>, etsi impediat praedicationem formalem, non tamen illam, <i>quae est per identitatem</i>, ut patet in Deo, ubi concretum praedicatur de ab-</p> | <p>Quantum ad primum ergo est inquirendum utrum homo addat aliquid supra humanitatem et hic homo super hanc humanitatem et quid sit illud.</p> <p>Videtur autem quod suppositum aliquid addat supra naturam cum in talibus unum de alio non praedicetur, scilicet humanitas de homine et albedo de albo, cum tamen homo per se et essentialiter non significet aliquid suorum accidentium nec etiam album significat substantiam. Hoc autem non videretur contingere</p> |

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| tas", non autem dicitur "homo est humanitas". | stracto praedicatione per identitatem. | nisi homo etiam praeter sua accidentia, et album praeter substantiam aliquid importet ratione cuius aliquo modo realiter differant ab humanitate et albedine, quoniam non solus modus significandi vel intelligendi absque aliqua diversitate reali videtur impedire praedicationem per identitatem, licet formalem impediatur, sicut patet in divinis; nam ibi dicitur Deus est deitas. |
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| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i> , 20, ll. 30–35:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | GUILLELMUS DE GODINO 2025, <i>Lectura Thomasina I</i> , 46, ll. 42–48 and 47, ll. 56–61:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS 1914, <i>Quodlibet V-VII</i> , 304–305:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Sed ista positio non valet penes modos.<br>Primo, sicut <i>impossibile est</i> , quod <i>aliqua</i> differant <i>ratione</i> , nisi vel sint <i>diversae rationes</i> , vel nisi <i>habent</i> vel includant <i>diversas res</i> , ambo vel alterum. Materia ergo extensa non differt <i>realiter a materia non extensa</i> , nisi addat <i>aliquam rem</i> . | Sed istud in multis deficit.<br>Primo quantum ad hoc, quod dicunt de materia extensa, quia sicut <i>impossibile est aliqua ratione differre</i> , nisi <i>habeant diversas rationes</i> vel sint <i>diversae rationes</i> , ita impossibile est aliqua differre <i>realiter</i> , nisi vel sint <i>diversae res</i> vel habentia <i>diversas res</i> . Ergo impossibile est materiam extensam <i>realiter differre a materia non extensa</i> , nisi unum includat <i>aliquam rem</i> , quam aliud non includit. | Sed istud non videtur bene dictum; sed melius videtur dicendum quod suppositum, secundum dictum modum accipiendi, nullam rem addit per se de suo principali significato supra naturam et ex consequenti patet quod nec realiter differt a natura. Quod enim aliquid differat realiter ab aliquo et non sit res alia nec rem aliam includat implicat contradictoria. Sicut enim quae differunt ratione diversas rationes oportet importare et qui ponit quod aliquid differat ratione |

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| <p>Extensa ergo dicit totum, quia materiam quantam, et differt a materia non extensa sicut totum a parte.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                               | <p>[...]<br/>Quod autem dicitur de differentia materiae extensae, nihil valet, quia differentia materiae extensae et materiae est differentia totius et partis, quorum unum includit aliquam rem, quam aliud non includit. Nam materia extensa dicit compositionem ex materia et quantitate sive extensione, quod idem est.</p> | <p>ab aliquo et non sit alia ratio vel non includat aliam rationem quam illud, implicat contradictoria; ita quae differunt realiter, diversas res importare oportet, et qui ponit quod aliquid differat realiter ab aliquo et non sit res alia nec aliam rem includat manifeste contradictionem includit.</p> |
| <p>IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i>, 20, l. 42-21, l. 54:</p> <p>Unde est alia opinio, quae dicit, quod suppositum et natura differunt non realiter, sed solum in <i>modo significandi</i>, et sic est in omni abstracto et concreto, quia sic se habent suppositum et natura sicut <i>abstractum et</i></p> | <p>GUILLELMUS DE GODINO 2025, <i>Lectura Thomasina I</i>, 48, ll. 77-85:</p> <p>Et ideo alii dicunt subtilius, quod <i>abstractum et concretum</i>, sicut homo et humanitas, sunt penitus idem re et differunt solo <i>modo significandi</i> et hoc declarant,</p>                                                              | <p>GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS 1914, <i>Quodlibet V-VII</i>, 308:</p> <p>Et ideo videtur dicendum quod suppositum sic acceptum non differt a natura nisi sicut concretum vel sump-tum et principale sive abstractum. Unde idem est quod intelligitur et significatur principaliter</p>                             |

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| <p><i>concretum</i>. Et hoc primo probant dupliciter.</p> <p>Primo sic, quia illa sunt idem <i>re</i>, quae habent eandem definitionem; sed si definiatur homo et humanitas, eadem ponentur in definitione utriusque, sicut patet in VII <i>Metaphysicae</i>, ubi Philosophus quaerens, utrum differat unumquodque et quod quid est eius, dicit, quod in his, quae sunt per se, non differunt; in his autem, quae sunt per accidens, differt.</p> | <p>quia ista sunt eadem <i>re</i> quae habent eandem definitionem; sed in definitione utriusque, scilicet concreti et abstracti, idem ponitur; ergo sunt idem realiter. Et confirmatur per Philosophum VII <i>Metaphysicae</i>, quia in his, quae sunt per se, idem est quod quid est et id, cuius est.</p> | <p>per utrumque; sed alius est modus significandi et intelligendi prout intelligitur et significatur per nomen abstractum essentiae et per nomen concretum suppositi.</p> <p>Quod autem sit omnino idem significatum principale utrobique hoc patet; nam id quod terminus significat implicite et confuse non distincte, significat diffinitio indicans quod quid est explicite et distincte. Sed quicquid pertinet ad diffinitionem naturae pertinet ad diffinitionem suppositi et e converso. Nam, etsi diffiniatur humanitas, quaecumque ponentur in eius diffinitione sub nominibus abstractis ponentur in diffinitione hominis sub nominibus concretis et e converso, ut patet, si pertractetur diffinitio tam logica quam naturalis; quare et cetera. Et hoc modo est verum quod dicit Philosophus, septimo <i>Metaphysicae</i>, quod in his quae sunt per se idem est res et quod quid est rei; per rem autem videtur intelligere suppositum, per quod quid est essentiam; entia autem per se, ut patet, ibi intelligit quae important</p> |
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| <p><i>Commentator</i> autem li “<i>per se</i>” exponit de substantia.</p> <p>Unde idem est homo et quod quid est hominis, non autem album et quod quid est albi, quia quod quid est albi est natura albi, quae est qualitas, quia album puram qualitatem significat, sicut dicitur in Praedicamentis, sed habens album, quod est suppositum eius, est aliud sicut lignum vel lapis.</p> | <p>Et exponit <i>Commentator per se</i> ens substantiam particularem, in composito autem ex subiecto et accidente differt.</p> | <p>unam naturam unius generis vel praedicamenti et praecipue substantiae, ut homo, quia entia per accidens in quibus dicit hoc non esse idem, intelligit composita ex substantiis et accidentibus, ut est homo albus, secundum quod ibi pertractat.</p> <p>Homo enim nihil aliud est quam quod quid est hominis; nec enim aliud significat homo quam animal rationale et cetera. Sed res alba non est idem omnino cum eo quod est quid album, quod scilicet significatur nomine albi; nam album non significat nisi qualitatem, res autem alba est habens qualitatem et cetera.</p> |
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Another significant case of close textual correspondence becomes evident when comparing Picard’s *Quaestiones* with Hervaeus Natalis’s *Commentarium in libros Sententiarum*. In question 11 (*Utrum in materia generabilium et corruptibilium sit aliqua inchoatio*), Picard’s solution to the problem of whether an inchoated form exists within matter aligns almost word-for-word with Hervaeus Natalis’s response to book II, article 2 of question 1, distinction 18 of his *Commentarium*:<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> An in-depth study of this question by Picard was presented at the XXIX Annual Colloquium of the SIEPM, *Caos y orden en la filosofía medieval* (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 3–5 September 2025), and will be published in a forthcoming paper.

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| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i> , 107, l. 313–108, l. 329:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | HERVAEUS NATALIS 1647, <i>Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum</i> , 258a–b:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| <i>Et ideo est tertia opinio, quae dicit, quod formam educi de potentia materiae est formam dependere in esse et fieri a materia ita, quod nec esse nec fieri competat formae proprie, sed composito;</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | <i>Et ideo est tertia opinio quae ponit quod educi de potentia materiae. Uno modo est formam in esse et fieri dependere a materia: ita quod nec esse, nec fieri competat formae proprie; sed alicui composito ex subiecto et forma.</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| <i>et dicitur educi de potentia materiae, quia in potentia materiae est passive, quod talis forma vadit ad esse; sicut enim dicimus, quod in sole est illuminare active, quia ab eo active dependet lumen, ita in potentia materiae est forma, quia in potentia eius passiva est, quod talis forma ducatur ad esse et de potentia eius passiva dependet, quod forma pertingat ad esse; et quia etiam fieri est tantum compositi, ideo dicitur educi de potentia.</i> | <i>Et dicitur educi de potentia materiae: quia in potentia passiva materiae, sive in ipsa materia passive, est quod talis forma vadat ad esse, et non aliter; ita quod sicut dicimus quod in sole est illuminare active, quia ab eo active dependet lumen: et etiam dicimus quod in potentia materiae est forma: quia in potentia eius passiva est quod talis forma ducatur ad esse: et de potentia eius passiva dependet, quod forma pertingat ad esse. Quia etiam fieri talis formae non est eius, sed compositi ex ipsa et materia. Ideo dicitur educi de potentia materiae.</i> |
| <i>Sed notandum, quod tripliciter est potentia. Obedientialis, ut quando de trunco fit vitulus, et haec potentia nihil aliud est quam subiectum aliquod, quod est aptum reduci in actum ab agente non requirente dispositiones naturales in subiecto, quale est Deus.</i>                                                                                                                                                                                            | <i>Est autem sciendum quod duplex est potentia, scilicet potentia obedientialis secundum quam fit de non grato, gratum; vel de trunco vitulus. Et haec potentia non est aliud quam subiectum aliquod secundum quod est aptum moveri, vel reduci in actu ab agente non requirente dispositiones naturales in subiecto quale agens est Deus. Unde talia educuntur de potentia obedientiali sicut gratia, et vitulus si fieret de trunco.</i>                                                                                                                                          |
| <i>Alia est potentia naturalis, scilicet potentia alicuius subiecti, secundum quod est mobile ab agente requirente dispositiones naturales.</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | <i>Alia dicitur potentia naturalis, scilicet potentia alicuius subiecti secundum quod est mobile ab agente requirente dispositiones naturales puta calidum, vel frigidum: humidum vel siccum, vel aliquid tale.</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| <i>Alio modo dicitur educi de potentia materiae aliquid active a potentiis activis collatis rebus corporalibus, non quod talis</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | <i>Alio modo minus usitato dicitur educi de potentia materiae, educi active a potentiis activis collatis rebus materialibus, et</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

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| <p>eductio ponat principium activum in materia, inquantum inducitur forma, et sic educi nihil aliud est quam produci a principio activo collato alicui rei materiali;</p> <p>illae ergo formae educuntur, quae possunt fieri ab aliqua virtute corporali; quae autem non possunt fieri, non educuntur.</p> | <p>corporalibus: non autem quod educi de potentia materiae ponat principium activum in materia in quam inducitur forma. Et sic educi de potentia materiae nihil aliud est quam produci a principio activo collato alicui rei materiali. Et secundum istum modum facile esset ostendere quae formae educantur de potentia materiae; et quae non. Quia ille secundum hoc educuntur quae possunt effici ab aliqua virtute corporali: quae autem non possunt sic fieri non educuntur. Quod autem dicantur formae effici, vel educi minus proprie dictum est. Imo magis debet dici compositum fieri, vel educi secundum formam. Sicut est compositum est illud quod proprie habet esse secundum formam; sicut homo habet esse album, secundum albedinem.</p> |
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Unlike William Peter of Godin, Hervaeus Natalis likely wrote his *Commentarium in libros Sententiarum* in Paris during the years 1302–1303.<sup>45</sup> At this stage of research, the absence of definitive dating evidence for Picard’s *Quaestiones*<sup>46</sup> makes it impossible to establish the direction of textual dependence with certainty. Nevertheless, the short time span between these Parisian and German writings highlights the rapid transmission of manuscripts in the late Middle Ages and underscores how the movement of scholarly works between universities and *studia* at the time was very dynamic and decisive.

Question 11 reveals another figure, besides Hervaeus, contributing to this mosaic of sources: James of Viterbo. At the beginning of the question, Picard lists nine opinions on the existence of an inchoated form in matter, examines each in turn, and ultimately offers his own responses. A philological analysis of the sources shows that the ninth and final position refuted by Picard can be

<sup>45</sup> See SCHABEL 2018, 355–356. For an updated bibliography on Hervaeus Natalis and his *Commentarium*, see CALMA 2018, 19–29, esp. 27. On Hervaeus’ biography, see the old but still valuable account in DE GUIMARÃES 1938, esp. 38.

<sup>46</sup> See LASORELLA 2023, esp. 105–106.

clearly attributed to James, who developed his theory of the *inchoatio formae*<sup>47</sup> in question 5 of his *Quodlibet II*, composed in Paris between 1293 and 1296:<sup>48</sup>

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| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i> , 105, ll. 232–240:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | IACOBUS DE VITERBO 1969, <i>Disputatio secunda de Quodlibet</i> , 70, l. 380–71, l. 388 and 71, ll. 418–421:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| <p>Unde est nona opinio, quae dicit, quod in materia praeexistat forma non in actu nec secundum partem, sed tota secundum esse potentiale ita, quod illa eadem potentia est postea actus, et sicut res composita est ex materia et forma in actu, ita et in materia est compositio materiae et potentiae, quia ipsa potentia nihil aliud est nisi ipsa-met forma sub esse potenciali, et talis potentia dicitur inchoatio formae sive seminarium sive exordium quoddam, sicut dicimus habere seminaria scientiarum et virtutum,</p> <p>ita et materia habet formam, et illa potentia non dicit privationem formae simpliciter vel essentiae eius, sed privationem eius secundum tale esse, scilicet actuale, et talis potentia est in secunda specie qualitatis.</p> | <p>Sed oportet aliquid aliud ponere in materia, per quod dicatur habilis et apta ad formam. Hoc autem est exordium quoddam et inchoatio ipsius formae. Quid autem sit huiusmodi exordium vel inchoatio, sic potest declarari: forma enim quaelibet habet duplex esse, scilicet in potentia et in actu. Et quia compositum principaliter habet esse per formam, ideo secundum duplex esse formae accipitur etiam duplex esse compositi, scilicet in potentia et in actu. Potentia vero et actus potentiam perficiens non dicunt diversam rem, sed solum diversum essendi modum eiusdem rei.</p> <p>[...]</p> <p>Quia vero huiusmodi aptitudo vel potentia imperfectum esse dicit, imperfectio autem sonat in privationem et carentiam, ideo huiusmodi aptitudo sive potentia carentiam et privationem includit; non privationem formae per omnem modum, sed privationem vel carentiam formae secundum esse actuale.</p> |

47 For a comprehensive examination of James of Viterbo's perspective on the *inchoatio formae*, see WIPPEL 1981, 293–314 and GOSSIAUX 2021.

48 YPMA 1968, V–VI and YPMA 1969, VI.

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| <p>IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i>, 105, ll. 241–250:</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | <p>IACOBUS DE VITERBO 1969, <i>Disputatio secunda de Quodlibet</i>, 71, ll. 396–398 and 71, ll. 414–418; 74, l. 521–75, l. 526 and 75, ll. 530–532:</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| <p>Istud probatur primo per Simplicium Super libro Praedicamentorum, qui loquens de hac specie dicit, quod “in toto mundo si qua producat generatio, non aliter quam per potentiam in substantiam producit et perficitur, et materia in suscipiendo speciem per potentiam in ipsam provenit”; “ab imperfecto ad perfectum procedit aliquid, nisi potentia media adfuerit, addens quidem quod deficit ad perfectum, suscipiens autem completionem a perfectissimo”, et infra: “Opera enim naturae in motu sunt, qui ex potentia hac in actum procedit”. Secundo Commentator VIII Metaphysicae, quod id, quod est in actu, non est aliud ab eo, quod est in potentia; sed “id idem, quod fuit in potentia, est in actu, et non sunt haec duo diversa”.</p> | <p>Unde dicit Commentator, in VIII Metaphysicae, quod id quod est in actu, non est aliud ab eo quod est in potentia, “sed illud idem quod fuit in potentia est in actu; et non sunt hic duo diversa”.<br/>[...]<br/>Unde Simplicius, in Praedicamentis loquens de huiusmodi potentia, quae ad secundam speciem qualitatis pertinet, ait in toto mundo si qua producat generatio, non aliter quam per potentiam in substantiam producit et perficitur, et materia in suscipiendo speciem per potentiam in ipsam provenit.<br/>[...]<br/>Confirmatur autem haec ratio auctoritate Simplicii in Praedicamentis, ubi loquens de potentia quae pertinet ad secundam speciem qualitatis, dicit sic: est autem hoc genus potentiae conveniens omnibus quae qualitercumque perficiuntur. Non enim totaliter ab imperfecto ad perfectum procedit aliquid, nisi potentia media affuerit, addens quidem quod deficit ad perfectum, suscipiens autem completionem a perfectissimo.<br/>[...]<br/>Et post pauca, ostendens in quibus consideratur talis potentia, dicit: Evidens autem est maxime secundum naturam. Opera enim naturae in motu sunt, qui ex potentia hac in actum procedit.</p> |

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| <p>IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones I-XIX</i>, 105, l. 251–106, l. 258:</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | <p>IACOBUS DE VITERBO 1969, <i>Disputatio secunda de Quodlibet</i>, 74, ll. 440–458 and 74, l. 514–20:</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <p>Item idem loquens de generatione compositi dicit: “Est igitur aliquid unum, quod primo est in potentia et post transfertur de potentia ad actum. Translatio enim eius non largitur ei multitudinem, sed perfectionem in esse”;</p> <p>esset autem multitudo, nisi prius esset duo, scilicet materia et potentia, sicut post, scilicet materia et forma.</p> <p>Item medium participat naturam extremorum, sed subiectum differt ab extremis sicut lignum ab albo et nega-</p> | <p>Quod autem ponenda sit talis inchoatio formae, potest multipliciter ostendi. Primo quidem ex verbis Commentatoris, in VIII Metaphysicae, ubi loquens de generatione compositi, quae est transmutatio de potentia in actum, sic dicit: “Est igitur aliquod unum, quod primo est in potentia, et post transfertur de potentia in actum. Translatio enim eius non largitur ei multitudinem, sed perfectionem in esse”.</p> <p>Ex quibus verbis evidenter accipitur quod per hoc, quod aliquid transmutatur per agens de potentia in actum, non acquiritur aliqua nova res, sed solum novus essendi modus. Si enim acquireretur res nova, tunc translatio de potentia in actum largiretur multitudinem, quia, transmutatione completa, essent plures res quam ante transmutationem. Econtra igitur si translatio de potentia in actum non largitur multitudinem, sed solum perfectum esse, non sunt plures res transmutatione completa, quam ante transmutationem. Sicut ergo post transmutationem in composito in actu sunt duae res, scilicet materia et forma, ita et ante transmutationem in composito in potentia sunt duae res, scilicet materia et forma; non tamen eodem modo, quia in composito in actu est forma in actu, in composito vero in potentia est forma in potentia.</p> <p>[...]</p> <p>Quarto arguitur idem sic: Esse in potentia medium est inter esse actu et non esse omnino, ut album in potentia</p> |

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| <p>tione albi et materia a forma et privatione formae, cum oportet distinguere lignum a potentia albi et materiam a potentia formae; unde oporteret dicere, quod sit aliud potentia materiae et potentia formae.</p> | <p>medium est inter album in actu et omnino non album, quod est negatio albi. Medium autem communicat aequaliter cum extremis. Quare, sicut albedo in actu et negatio albedinis sunt aliud a materia, sic et albedo in potentia est aliud a materia. Hoc autem non potest esse aliquid aliud, nisi ipsa res quae est albedo secundum esse potentiale.</p> |
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As in the case of the *Correctorium corruptorii "Circa"*, the presence of James's *Quodlibet II*, together with that of Godfrey of Fontaines, attests the significant range of Parisian writings that Picard drew upon in composing his *Quaestiones*. Ultimately, Picard's work not only exemplifies a bricolage of texts,<sup>49</sup> authors, and literary genres, but it also demonstrates that Dominican theologians in Cologne at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries engaged with the major intellectual debates of their time in close exchange with their Parisian contemporaries and their diverse works.

### 3.c) Oxford – John Dymdale

Beyond the previous parallels with the Parisian authors, the most striking discovery concerning Picard's sources was made at the *Fourteenth Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies* in 1988, but this has been overlooked until the present day.<sup>50</sup> On that occasion, Charles Ermatinger presented compelling evidence that Picard's question 12 (*Utrum in materia sit aliqua forma diminuta, quae fiat forma, supposito quod non sit principium activum*), question 13 (*Utrum materia prima sit una omnium*), and question 14 (*Utrum materia proxima aliquid reale addat super materiam primam*) are condensed versions of disputed questions on Books VII and VIII of Aristotle's *Metaphysica*, composed in Oxford during the early 1280s by the English master of arts John Dymdale.<sup>51</sup> Even though Ermatinger did not publish either John Dymdale's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*<sup>52</sup> or John

49 On the historiographical use of the concept of 'bricolage of texts' to characterize certain late medieval philosophical writings, see BRINZEI 2011.

50 See LASORELLA 2025(1), 138–145.

51 ERMATINGER 1988. On the problematic dating of John Dymdale's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, see DONATI 2014, 143, fn. 26.

52 On Dymdale's life, works and related bibliography, see LASORELLA 2026.

Picard's *Quaestiones*, a thorough examination of the parallels between the two works has confirmed Ermatinger's thesis.<sup>53</sup> The following tables illustrate the close parallels between Picard's and Dymdsdale's works and offer some insight into how Picard employs Dymdsdale:

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
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| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, <i>Quaestiones</i> I-XIX, 109, ll. 4–19:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | IOHANNES DE TYTYNGSALE, <i>Quaestiones super Metaphysicam</i> VII; in MS C IV.20, f. 127rb and H 293, f. 92ra–b:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| <i>Et videtur, quod sic. "Agens extrahit formam a materia" per Commentatorem in multis locis; sed nihil extrahitur ab alio, nisi prius fuerit in illo; sed non completa; ergo diminute; ergo etc.</i>                                                                                                        | <i>Et videtur quod sic. "Agens extrahit formam a materia" secundum Commentatorem in multis locis; sed nihil abstrahitur ab aliquo, nisi prius fuerit in esse; ergo forma prius fuit in materia et non completa; ergo diminuta.</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| Item Commentator in XI: <i>"Forma fit ex non forma"; ergo ex forma; sed non completa; ergo diminuta.</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Praeterea hoc est impossibile secundum Commentatorem in XII: <i>"Forma fit ex non forma"; ergo necessario fiet ex forma et non completa; ergo diminuta.</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| Item nisi in materia esset forma diminuta, quae postmodum fieret forma rei, esset ab extrinseco; sic essent datores formarum.                                                                                                                                                                                | Praeterea nisi in materia esset forma diminuta, quae post fieret forma rei, forma totaliter fieret ab extrinseco, et sic esset dator formarum.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Item forma est in materia aut ex nihilo aut ex aliquo. Non ex nihilo, quia inter nihil et aliquid est infinita distantia, quae non potest per agens finitae virtutis pertransiri. Nec ex aliquo, quod est ex materia, tunc materia esset pars formae, quod falsum est; ergo ex aliquo, quod est pars formae. | Praeterea forma est in materia; aut ergo processit ex aliquo aut ex nihilo. Non ex nihilo, quia inter aliquid et nihil est infinita distantia, quae non potest transiri per agens finitae virtutis. Nec ex aliquo, quia non ex aliquo ut ex materia, quia tunc materia esset pars formae; ergo est ex aliquo, quod est pars formae; talis est forma diminuta; ergo etc. Si dicatur, quod forma non fit per se, sed per accidens, idem argumentum.<br>Ad oppositum. Apud generationem substantiae non est forma diminuta de genere perfectionis illius, ad quam tendit generatio, secundum Commentatorem in V Physicae; ergo etc. |

<sup>53</sup> For the critical edition of these three Dymdsdale's questions and a detailed analysis of his doctrines of diminished form, and of prime and proximate matter, see LASORELLA 2026.

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
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| <p><i>Ad illud dicitur: In materia necesse est praeesse formam rei diminutam, quae postea fiat forma rei, alioquin forma fieret ex nihilo, et formarum esset creatio.</i></p> <p><i>Istud non est verum, quia indivisibile, ubi est, totaliter est; forma substantialis indivisibilis; ergo ubi est, totaliter est.</i></p> <p><i>Si igitur in materia praefuit, totaliter praefuit, ex quo sequitur opinio Anaxagorae, quod quidlibet actu sit in quolibet.</i></p> | <p><i>Ad illud dicitur, quod in materia necesse est praeesse formam diminutam, quae postea fiat forma rei, alioquin fieret ex nihilo et esset formarum creatio.</i></p> <p><i>Sed istud non videtur esse verum, quia indivisibile, ubi est, totaliter est; sed forma substantialis est indivisibilis; ergo ubi est, totaliter est. Si igitur in materia praefuit, totaliter praefuit; et tunc sequitur opinio Anaxagorae, quod quidlibet sit in quolibet actu, quod est impossibile.</i></p> |
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Overall, Picard reproduces Dymsdale's original text almost verbatim but omits certain passages for the sake of conciseness. As a result of his omissions, Picard's version is less clear and manifests internal inconsistencies. In this passage of question 12, Picard and Dymsdale initially present four arguments in support of the existence of a diminished form in matter. At this point, however, Picard's version briefly diverges from Dymsdale's. Specifically, Dymsdale introduces a counterargument to the main thesis, which Picard omits. After this divergence, both texts proceed in parallel, offering a fifth demonstration of the necessity of a diminished form, introduced by the Latin expression: 'ad illud dicitur'. This fifth argument does not directly respond to the theoretical content of the counterargument found in Dymsdale's version; rather, it serves as an additional, independent demonstration of the existence of a diminished form in matter. Consequently, the expression 'ad illud dicitur' should be understood as a stylistic marker indicating a return to the main line of argumentation and highlighting the need for further evidence to substantiate this thesis. Under this interpretation, the counterargument appears as an interruption in the sequence of *argumenta* presented in the text. I suggest that Picard regarded this section as unnecessary and chose to omit it, thereby integrating the fifth argument with the preceding four. However, in implementing this structural modification, Picard retains Dymsdale's introductory expression 'ad illud dicitur', resulting in textual ambiguity. In the absence of a counterargument, the sequence of arguments remains uninterrupted, eliminating the need for a stylistic expression indicating a return to the *argumenta* section. Ultimately, Picard's alteration of Dymsdale's text produces an unclear and internally inconsistent passage.

Another noteworthy case is found in question 13, where Picard, rather than reproducing the original text slavishly, significantly alters Dymdsdale's work in his response to the first objection of the question:

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
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| IOHANNES PICARDI 2025, 112, ll. 2–4 and 114, ll. 49–52:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | IOHANNES DE TYTYNGSALE, <i>Quaestiones super Metaphysicam</i> VIII; in MS C IV.20, f. 152rb and H 293, f. 107rb; MS C IV.20, ff. 152vb–153ra:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| <p><i>Quaeritur, utrum materia prima sit una omnium.</i><br/> <i>Et videtur, quod sic, quia id, in quo stat resolutio omnium, est unum numero, ut patet per Philosophum II Metaphysicae, quia in causis est status.</i></p> <p>[...]<br/> <i>Ad argumenta. Ad primum dicendum, sicut supra.</i></p> <p><i>Ad probationem dicendum, quod non est eadem ratio de fine et efficiente et materia et forma, quia haec sunt principia intrinseca, et ideo quot sunt principiata, tot sunt formae et materiae,</i></p> <p><i>sed illa sunt separata a principiatis et in illis devenitur ad unum.</i></p> | <p><i>Nunc quaeritur, utrum una materia prima sit una omnium numero.</i><br/> <i>Et videtur quod sic. Illud, ad quod stat resolutio omnium generabilium, est unum numero; sed materia prima est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet per Philosophum in II Metaphysicae, ubi dicit, quod status est in omni causa; sed in causa efficiente et finali est devenire ad aliquod primum unum numero; ergo et in causis materialibus.</i></p> <p>[...]<br/> <i>Ad primum argumentum dicendum, quod, cum dicitur, quod illud est unum numero, ad quod stat resolutio, dicendum quod hoc non est verum, immo requiritur ad hoc, quod stat resolutio, non quod sit idem numero, sed quod sit idem, scilicet unum per indifferentiam et privationem, et quod non sit aliquid prius eo in suo genere.</i><br/> <i>Ad probationem dicendum, quod non est eadem ratio de causis extrinsecis, ut de fine et efficiente, et de materia et forma, quia materia et forma sunt principia intrinseca, et ideo quot sunt principiata, tot sunt formae primae et materiae primae, et sicut non est una forma omnium, sic nec est una materia omnium. Sed finis et efficiens sunt separata a principiatis, et ideo possibile est devenire ad unum principiatum numero.</i></p> |

Here, Picard not only removes a portion of the original objection – thereby eliminating Dymdsdale’s supporting demonstration – but also omits almost the entire detailed response to it. However, this series of omissions introduces a structural ambiguity. Although Picard excludes Dymdsdale’s proof of the first objection from his own text, he nonetheless refutes it in his brief response (*ad probationem*). This structure creates a clear textual inconsistency, as Picard appears to respond to an argument that does not exist in his version of the text.

One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that during the process of composition and revision of his text, Picard may have left certain sections provisional while still determining how to structure and complete his text. Two pieces of evidence support this hypothesis: first, the very existence of these textual parallels between Dymdsdale and Picard, and second, the fact that Picard’s text, as transmitted by the Vatican manuscript, represents a work still in progress and incomplete – one which had yet to undergo multiple stages of revision before reaching its final, polished form.<sup>54</sup>

These findings regarding Picard’s use of Dymdsdale has two noteworthy implications. First, a manuscript containing John Dymdsdale’s disputed questions on Aristotle’s *Metaphysica* was extant in Cologne at the time Picard was writing his *Quaestiones*. Second, there were philosophical discussions in Cologne that have, so far, received little attention from contemporary scholars; a more thorough search for the implicit sources of German medieval texts, like the *Quaestiones*, could help to uncover them.

Furthermore, these findings are consistent with the results of studies already conducted by Fiorella Retucci, which have successfully demonstrated the pivotal role of the Oxford theologian Thomas of York on the German Dominican Berthold of Moosburg.<sup>55</sup> The correlations between these Oxonian and German writings demonstrate that, in the later Middle Ages, the intellectual landscape of Cologne cannot be adequately understood by focusing solely on local influences or on its exclusive relationship with Paris. Rather, the intellectual life that

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54 LASORELLA 2025(2), XXII–XXIII and LASORELLA 2025(1), 18–33. Furthermore, Dymdsdale’s *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* were useful during the preparation of the edition of Picard’s *Quaestiones*, whose text was in some instances emended on the basis of Dymdsdale’s work. On this, see LASORELLA 2025(2), XXV–XXVI.

55 See RETUCCI 2019, RETUCCI 2021 and RETUCCI 2025.

flourished in Cologne at the time should be regarded as the outcome of a complex transnational network of cultural institutions, reflected in the wide range of sources and references evident in the works of German thinkers such as John Picard of Lichtenberg.<sup>56</sup>

#### 4. Conclusions

Born out of the editorial workshop of Dietrich of Freiberg's *Opera Omnia*, the *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevii* originated from the groundbreaking discovery of an unexpected network of debates around Dietrich's thought within the German intellectual context of the time. With the goal of shedding greater light on the intellectual activities and production pursued in the Teutonic province, the project identified a large collection of unedited texts, the authors of which were predominantly active at the Dominican *Studium generale* in Cologne, providing the basis for filling a significant gap in the edition of Latin medieval texts.<sup>57</sup> This innovative regional approach to Latin medieval philosophy enabled the CPTMA to demonstrate the existence of a German exceptional philosophical thought ("ein deutscher Sonderweg"),<sup>58</sup> intimately connected to Dietrich's doctrines and driven by the aim of carrying forward Albert's Neoplatonic legacy.<sup>59</sup> This perspective positioned German medieval philosophy as a unique intellectual tradition, distinct from its Parisian and Oxonian counterparts.

Fifty years after its foundation, the CPTMA nears the conclusion of its scholarly endeavour with the publication of John Picard of Lichtenberg's *Quaestiones*, thus turning its attention to an author who, more than any other, stood apart from the dominant historiographical perspective of the *deutscher Sonderweg* and remained in the shadow of those figures considered representative of it.<sup>60</sup>

In the same vein as a philosophical microhistory,<sup>61</sup> the CPTMA has not only edited an extensive *corpus* of philosophical and theological writings produced

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56 RETUCCI 2025 and LASORELLA 2025(1), 138–145.

57 See STURLESE 1984.

58 STURLESE 1993, 388.

59 Cf. *supra* fn. 5.

60 RETUCCI 2025.

61 About the Italian current of microhistory research, see TRIVELLATO 2023, esp. 7–15 and 26–56; GRENDI 1977, LEVI 1993, GINZBURG 1994, GRENDI 1994.

in the German area during the late Middle Ages, but it has also subjected the historiographical perspective from which it originated to the rigor of the philological method:<sup>62</sup> through the historical truth disclosed by these new texts, the *CPT-MA* has redefined the contours of its own scientific narrative.<sup>63</sup> In this respect, Picard's *Quaestiones* exemplifies what Edoardo Grendi calls "the exceptional normality" (*l'eccezionale normale*): a singular document that, although regarded as a marginal and anomalous case within the dominant historiographical framework, can uncover the underlying norms of life in a particular historical context.<sup>64</sup> The critical edition of Picard's *Quaestiones*, through the investigation into his sources, has shown that, rather than belonging to the alternative philosophical tradition confined to Germany, Picard actively engaged in a wider scholastic discourse. His apparent anomaly thus reveals that German medieval philosophy evolved not in total opposition to the philosophical interests and debates spread outside Germany, but through a lively exchange with them. Picard's case ultimately demonstrates that German medieval philosophy was a comprehensive intellectual enterprise: a complex and multifaceted phenomenon encompassing regional developments and transnational influences, exemplifying the inherently interconnected and dynamic character of medieval intellectual life.<sup>65</sup>

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62 GARIN 1990, 77–78.

63 FLASCH 1998, 643 and 647.

64 GRENDI 1977, 512; see also GRENDI 1994, 532; GINZBURG 1994, 544. In addition to those, see TRIVELLATO 2023, 30–31.

65 Cf. COURTENAY 2010, 257–259 and LASORELLA 2023, 107.

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